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SCHOLARLY OPINION
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT'S MISSION TO RESTRICT REMEDIES
FOR STATE PRISONERS BACKFIRES
ANDREA D. LYON*
INTRODUCTION
Anyone reading the United States Supreme Court pronouncements on
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners can see there is one recurrent theme:
keep away. The prosecutorial attack on the "Great Writ" has been sustained
and largely successful in the courts; a series of roadblocks taking the form
of procedural barriers and technical rules' make it increasingly difficult for
a state prisoner to take a case to federal court when he or she alleges a
violation of the United States Constitution.
There are so many procedural hurdles to leap over that a federal district
court finds it difficult to reach the central issue in the case: is this man
innocent? Does it matter if he is innocent?2 Should he have gotten the
death penalty? Should we do something about the fact that his confession
* Andrea D. Lyon is the Director of the Illinois Capital Resource Center, an agency which
recruits, trains and gives litigation support to a panel of attorneys representing indigent death
row inmates on collateral review in state and federal courts, as well as providing direct
representation. Ms. Lyon is a graduate of the Antioch School of Law and Rutgers University.
She is the former Chief of the Cook County Public Defender's Homicide Task Force. She is
a nationally recognized expert on death penalty litigation, is on the faculty of the National
Criminal Defense College, and lectures throughout the country on capital, appellate and trial
advocacy. Ms. Lyon is an instructor in Appellate Advocacy at the Loyola School of Law.
Ms. Lyon wishes to thank attorney Dan Pisani who has been volunteering with the Illinois
Capital Resource Center for his assistance with research for this opinion.
1. These procedural barriers and technical rules take many forms, one being the
jurisprudence of the "new rule". The Supreme Court has held that although all decisions of the
United States Supreme Court will be held to apply retroactively to cases still on direct appeal,
they will not apply to habeas corpus cases on collateral review, unless the Supreme Court
decision is determined not to constitute a "new rule". See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989). See also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.
Ct. 1715 (1992); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993); JAMEs S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1991 update); Marshall J. Hartman, To Be or Not
To Be a "New Rule:" The Non-Retroactivity of Newly Recognized Constitutional Rights After
Conviction, 29 CAL. W.L. REv. 53 (1992).
2. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869-70 (1993) (holding that affidavits supporting
a defendant's claim of actual innocence were insufficient to entitle him to federal habeas corpus
relief from a death sentence). See also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgements, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970).
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was the product of coercion or torture by the police?3 These central
questions are often not reached at all by the courts, however, because a
series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court do not allow them
to.
4
Prosecutorial agencies and lobbyists have worked hard to get this result,
and for good reason. While the number of cases where relief of some sort
is given to the prisoner (or death row inmate) in state appellate courts is
somewhat less than 23 %,5 the percentage in the federal courts particularly
in the politically volatile area of capitally sentenced state prisoners, has been
greater than 45 V6 In other words, the defense was winning too much when
the merits of the case got discussed, even in front of primarily Republican
Reagan-Bush appointees to the federal bench.7
This opinion examines the intended and unintended effects of this assault
on the "Great Writ." First it briefly traces a history of the writ of habeas
corpus in the United States, then analyzes the increasing numbers of
procedural roadblocks erected by the United States Supreme Court in recent
years, and finally examines the unintended consequences of this assault: the
increased complexity and scope of litigation it now engenders.
I. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The Writ of Habeas Corpus, has a long and detailed history, possibly
dating as far back as the Roman Empire.' The "Great Writ" came to our
country by way of English Common Law,9 and is given explicit recognition
in the United States Constitution."0 The reach and power of the writ in
American courts coincided with two great events in U.S. history."
The first event was in 1867, immediately following the Civil War, when
3. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
4. See supra note 1.
5. For example, for the period from 1973-1991, 185 people were sentenced to death in the
state of Illinois. Of those 185 convicted murderers, 42 had their sentences or convictions
overturned. This is approximately a 22.7% reversal rate. See Capital Punishment 1991, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, page 2.
6. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992). In a 1991 study documenting the final
outcomes of capitally sentenced petitioners' habeas corpus challenges, 404 state-court capitaljudgements between July 1, 1976 and May 31, 1991 were examined. A total of 191 reversible
constitutional violations were found in these cases, making the violation rate an astonishing 47%.
Brief for Appellant, Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (Appendix B).
7. President Reagan appointed 389 federal judges between 1981 and 1989. President Bush
appointed 195 federal judges between 1989 and 1992. See THE HISTORY OF THE AUTHORIZATION
OF FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS, Statistics Division of the U.S. Government, table 8, page 149.
8. See Albert S. Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 55(1934).
9. Blackstone called it "the most celebrated writ in the English Law." Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 129).
10. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 9, cI. 2
11. See generally Marshall J. Hartman & Shelvin Singer, Requiem For Habeas Corpus, THE
CHAMPION, March 1994, at 12.
[Vol. 30
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the writ was extended to state court defendants. This allowed Federal Courts
to monitor State Court proceedings for the first time, thus insuring that the
Constitutional rights of defendants were not violated.
The second event was a series of decisions handed down by the Warren
Court during the 1960's extending the protections of the Bill of Rights to
defendants in state courts.13 In 1963, the Supreme Court decided three
landmark cases dealing with Federal Habeas Corpus, namely Fay v. Noia,14
Townsend v. Sain,15 and Sanders v. United States.16
The defendant in Fay v. Noia"7 was convicted of felony murder largely
because of a coerced confession. Even though the state conceded that the
confession was coerced, a federal court denied relief because Noia failed to
file a timely appeal, holding that this failure constituted an independent state
ground for the decision thus precluding Federal review.1
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, with one
dissenting judge, finding exceptional circumstances excused the statutory
requirement. 9 In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court
affirmed the reversal by the Second Circuit, and after an exhaustive
discussion of the history of the "Great Writ," the court held that such a
procedural failure should not deny a petitioner federal habeas relief unless the
state procedures were "deliberately bypassed" ."
In Townsend v. Sain ' the Supreme Court applied the same test for
when an evidentiary hearing on a petition from a state prisoner was
mandatory, that is, habeas petitioners were entitled to a complete evidentiary
hearing on their constitutional claims in federal court, unless they "deliber-
12. See generally SHELVIN SINGER & MARSHALL J. HARTMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE HANDBOOK ch. 1 (1986) (discussing Congress' legislative intent that the Fourteenth
Amendment make the Bill of Rights obligatory on the States).
13. Prior to these cases, The Supreme Court held that the protections guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights applied only in Federal Court. They refused to hold these protections applicable to
the States. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the appointment
of counsel to the criminally accused in state court); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(requiring the recitation of one's right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney while
being questioned in state custody).
14. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
15. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
16. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
17. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
18. Id. at 395-96. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that Noia's failure to perfect his appeal meant he must be denied relief under 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 which says in part that "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgement of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." Id. at 396.
19. Id. at 396-97.
20. Id. at 398-99, 439 (emphasis added).
21. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
1994]
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ately bypassed" the orderly procedure of the state courts.2' The Townsend
court was concerned that a constitutionally fair review of the facts occur, and
that a petitioner would not be deprived of this review merely because some
minimal review had occurred in state court.' In the aggregate, this case
cut through the procedural thicket of state and federal comity, and mandated
federal relief from unconstitutional state court action in criminal cases.
In Sanders v. United States,'4 the Supreme Court enunciated the test for
whether a second or successive petition constituted an abuse of the writ and
therefore required dismissal. One reason for dismissal depends on whether
or not a claim had been "deliberately abandoned" at the first hearing.'
Sanders applied that test to cases where counsel lacked factual or legal
knowledge of a specific constitutional claim when the petitioner's first habeas
corpus petition was filed. Relief would be granted to a successor petition
unless counsel had such knowledge and deliberately failed to raise the
claim.'
In 1977, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Burger, modified Fay
v. Noia,2- and substituted the "cause and prejudice" test to resolve questions
of state procedural default in Wainwright v. Sykes.' Under the Sykes test,
the petitioner had to show "cause" as to why he had not raised the claim
properly in the state court, as well as the "prejudice" resulting to him from
the alleged constitutional violation. 29
Sykes began the endless inquiries into what was cause, what constituted
prejudice, and what had been procedurally defaulted. It is in this context that
the series of cases restricting access to federal courts beginning with
McCleskey v. Zant,11 to Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,31 and culminating in
Brecht v. Abrahamson" were handed down by the United States Supreme
Court.
22. Id. at 317. That test was essentially a good faith test which required habeas relief unless
a petitioner or his counsel had "deliberately" failed to raise a claim in state court of which they
had factual or legal knowledge at the time. This decision did not purport to limit when a federal
district judge could hold a hearing, only when he or she must hold such a hearing. Id. at 317-19.
23. Id.
24. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
25. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 17.
27. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
28. 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
29. Id. See generally Marshall J. Hartman & Shelvin Singer, Supreme Court Compendium:
A Critique of Constitutional Criminal Cases Decided by the United States Supreme Court,
presented at the 1993 annual conference of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
30. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
31. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
32. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
268 [Vol. 30
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If. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Before a state prisoner can go to federal court to complain about
constitutional violations, he or she must "exhaust" state remedies.3 Simply
put, the state prisoner must give the state courts a chance to correct what is
wrong. As cited above, there is a greater than 45 % reversal rate in federal
court.Y The state courts, apparently, often fail to correct these wrongs.
Before the Aclesky decision, the burden on a state prisoner was to tell the
state courts about the federal constitutional wrong as soon as he or she was
in a position to prove it.
In McCleskey, Warren McCleskey suspected that a jail house snitch
named Evans, who testified against him at trial, had in fact been an agent of
the prosecution. McCleskey believed that Evans was planted there to
question him. Since McCleskey had a lawyer, it would be improper for
a state agent to question him without first notifying the lawyer, and without
warning McCleskey that he was speaking with an agent.
The prosecution had a duty to disclose whether or not this snitch was an
agent.3 Once disclosed, the defense would have had the opportunity to try
to suppress that evidence," and if that were not successful, to at least reveal
to the jury the witness's true role, and the fact that this role might affect
Evans' credibility, since he would have a motive to fabricate for financial
gain, for the possibility of an early release, or some other benefit.39
At any rate, McCleskey suspected this was the case, and he made such
a claim in his first state habeas petition, but as he had no proof, that petition
was denied.' He filed a federal habeas petition alleging other grounds
which was denied.41
Six years later, McCleskey's lawyer received a copy of a twenty-one
33. Ex Parte Royal, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
34. See supra note 6.
35. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 472.
36. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding that statements deliberately
elicited after defendant's indictment and retention of counsel to his codefendant acting for the
police were not admissible); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (holding that the right
to counsel was violated where an informant was placed in the same cell block with an indicted
defendant, was asked to listen, but not initiate conversations or question the defendant, and was
paid for providing information and testifying at trial); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985)
(holding that once adversary proceedings have been brought against defendant, the right to
counsel under the 6th Amendment is violated when the state knowingly exploits the opportunity
to record the statements of the accused made without his counsel present to the codefendant who
was acting as a police agent).
37. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding the prosecution is required to
turn over any material favorable to the defense); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55(1972) (finding the prosecution is required to present all material evidence to the jury).
38. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
39. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
40. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 472.
41. Id.
1994]
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page document given to the prosecutor before trial which seemingly
demonstrated that Evans was in fact working in concert with the Atlanta
police to eavesdrop on McCleskey and question him.42 A month after he
received this document which had been in the control of the prosecution, and
was utterly unavailable to him, he filed a second federal habeas petition.43
The district court granted relief,' but was reversed by the Eleventh
Circuit.4' This reversal was upheld by the United States Supreme Court,
finding an abuse of the writ for filing a second habeas petition on a ground
abandoned by McCleskey before he filed his first petition.41 Remember
now that this information was within the control of the prosecution,47 should
have been turned over by them,' and McCleskey had lost in state court
because he lacked proof the prosecution had. 49
The intended result of this decision was to make it virtually impossible
to go to federal court a second time. It has had that result in cases all over
the country, and Warren McCleskey was executed.
McCleskey, however, has had an unintended consequence. Those
defending capital cases, recognizing another burden that must be shouldered,
are forced to presume bad faith on the part of the prosecution and/or the
police. They must, therefore, raise good faith claims which allege misconduct
and request extensive discovery in order to adequately investigate those
claims. This discovery includes production of the prosecution and police
files, interrogatories, depositions, employment records of police officers
involved in the case, and many motions which must be litigated regarding
these and other items. °
This extensive discovery must be done not because defense attorneys
believe that most of the prosecutorial actors in the system abuse it, but
because defense counsel cannot wait six years to see if one of them has. The
client may be dead by that time.
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has insured enormously more
complex and costly litigation in the majority of criminal cases when it is
probably only necessary a small percentage of the time. If the Supreme
42. Id. at 474.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 475.
45. Id. at 476.
46. Id. at 498-503 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 499-500.
48. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
49. This result occurred even in the face of an obvious Brady violation. In Brady v.
Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held: "Mhe suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. at 87.
50. The right of discovery has been found to be applicable to collateral attacks as well. See
People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 526 N.E.2d 131 (IMI. 1988) where the Illinois Supreme Court
held that it is within a trial court's discretion, in a post-conviction proceeding, to allow discovery
depositions to be taken of people involved in the original criminal proceeding. Id. at 133.
[Vol. 30
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Court is truly concerned about "scarce judicial resources" as they say they
are,5 1 would it not be more cost-effective to allow the relatively small
number of second petitions that might get filed to be litigated as opposed to
forcing every case to become a "federal case"?
Another unintended consequence occurred in Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes. 2 In Tamayo-Reyes, the petitioner had raised all of his issues in state
court as required. 3 However, he had not presented each fact or witness to
support that petition in state court, and so he lost in the United States
Supreme Court, having "waived" or given up his right to present any fact
not previously presented.'
Until Tamayo-Reyes the requirement to get your case heard (not won
now, just heard) was that you plead every claim in state court.55 Tamayo-
Reyes, a Cuban immigrant, was charged with murder after he stabbed a man
in a bar. He was provided with defense counsel who suggested that he plead
to manslaughter. Since the defendant spoke little English, an interpreter
explained his rights to him and the consequences of his plea. The court
accepted his plea to manslaughter.5
Later, Tamayo-Reyes filed a collateral attack in state court on the
grounds that he did not understand the mens rea element of manslaughterY
A hearing was held, but the petitioner's counsel did not ask him whether his
interpreter had translated "manslaughter" for him.58  Nor did his counsel
employ a language expert to assess the interpreter's performance, or whether
Tamayo-Reyes could understand the translation. 59 The only evidence the
counsel introduced, other than the petitioner's testimony, was an affidavit by
the interpreter stating that he had translated manslaughter as "less than
murder."' The state court dismissed the petition. The State Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal, and the State Supreme Court denied
review.61
Tamayo-Reyes then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Federal District Court. He contended that the material facts concerning the
translation were not adequately developed at the state court hearing and,
51. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring);
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
52. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
53. Id. at 1716-17.
54. Id. at 1721.
55. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), adopted the reasoning of Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963), and held that habeas petitioners were entitled to a complete evidentiary hearing
on their constitutional claims in federal court, unless they "deliberately bypassed" the orderly
procedure of the state courts. 372 U.S. at 312-13.
56. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1716.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1722 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1717.
1994]
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citing Townsend v. Sain,62 sought a federal evidentiary hearing.63 The
District Court denied relief, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the failure to develop the critical facts was due to the negligence of defense
counsel.' It then went on to hold that the counsel's negligence did not
constitute a "deliberate bypass" by the petitioner. Therefore, Tamayo-Reyes
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in Federal Court. 65 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the "deliberate
bypass" standard of Townsend v. Sain,l was no longer the correct standard
for determining whether a petitioner who fails to develop a material fact in
state court was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court. 67
In overruling that portion of Townsend v. Sain,6 Justice White held
that the same standard that was used to determine the claims of a petitioner
who has procedurally defaulted in state court or "abused the writ" by failing
to raise an issue in his first federal habeas petition, should also be used to
determine if that petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal
court. 69  This would ensure uniformity with the holdings of the Supreme
Court in McCleskey v. Zant,70 and Wainwright v. Sykes.71 According to
Justice White, having a stricter standard for hearing a defaulted claim
considered in federal court made no sense.'
Justices O'Connor, joined by Kennedy, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissented. O'Connor believed that there was a difference between having the
federal court consider a claim, and having the court conduct a full evidentia-
ry hearing on that claim. 3
What this means in practical terms is that now one must fact plead as
well as claim plead. This requirement will have the intended result of
62. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
63. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1717.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
67. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1717-18.
68. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
69. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1719.
70. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
71. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
72. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1720. That is, whether a petitioner can show "cause and
prejudice," for any default, while the standard for having an evidentiary hearing in federal court
when evidence was not fully developed in state court, was whether the petitioner "deliberately
bypassed" the required state procedure. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1722-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy were with the majority in overruling the "deliberate bypass" standard
as it applied to "abuse of the writ" cases in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467. However, when
it comes to holding evidentiary hearings on claims being considered by the Federal Court, they
leave their former colleagues. Justice O'Connor argues for the dissent that once one has
overcome all the hurdles of having the federal court consider a claim-exhausting state remedies,
avoiding procedural default, not seeking retroactive application of a new rule of law, and not
abusing the writ-one should have a right to a hearing to prove the facts supporting his claim.
Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. at 1722. See generally Hartman & Singer, supra note 29, at 28.
[Vol. 30
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barring some claims in federal court. But it is having the unintended
consequence of forcing the defense bar to plead every conceivable fact which
might support a claim in state court. Again this requires extensive and
invasive discovery,74 encouraging counsel to be repetitive and over-inclusive
in order to avoid what might be a fatal mistake.
Finally in Brecht v. Abrahamson,75 the court has added a new layer to
the burden the defense has to satisfy once they have established a constitu-
tional error. Before Brecht, a constitutional wrong required reversal (and
usually a new trial) unless the prosecution could show that the error was
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"76 that the error did not affect the
outcome. That remains the burden during a direct appeal, but if one
established a constitutional wrong on collateral review (which allows you to
go outside the record and look at facts that should have been in the trial but
were not, such as the twenty-one page statement of the witness in
McCleskey7 ), the defense now has to show that the wrong "had a substan-
tial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict"."
Brecht will have the intended result of denying relief to many state
prisoners who are now in federal court. It will also have, however, the
unintended consequence of encouraging interviews of the jurors on the cases
in question to discover their opinions regarding the outcome had the constitu-
tional wrong been righted. In a judge sentencing, the deposition of that
judge may be necessary. It may necessitate the hiring of experts on juror
comprehension, legal experts, ethics experts, and a myriad of other
investigatory acts are needed to be able to satisfy the burdens placed on the
defense bar by the United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Litigating whether one has waived or given up an issue in a case,
whether constitutional error had a "substantial and injurious effect on ajury's
verdict", and laying the foundation for and litigating through motions all of
which require extensive discovery on every conceivable issue and fact takes
a considerable amount of time. The consequence is the diversion of scarce
judicial resources towards those "technicalities" which the press has
erroneously labeled as assisting the defense and away from the merits of the
case.
74. See text accompanying supra note 50.
75. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
76. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Prior to 1967, a constitutional error found
in a case on review resulted in automatic reversal. But in Chapman, the Supreme Court held
that a conviction could be upheld, even in light of a constitutional error, as long as the
prosecution could establish that the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See also
Hartman & Singer, supra note 11, at 12; JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1988).
77. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991).
78. 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
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All this leads one to ask the question: what is the Supreme Court afraid
of? Why don't prosecutors want us to get to the merits, the bottom line, the
central issues of the case? As Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent in
McCleskey v. Kemp: 79 could it be everyone is afraid of too much justice?
79. 482 U.S. 920 (1987). The Supreme Court considered massive amounts of evidence that
Warren McCleskey had gathered showing the racially biased imposition of the death penalty in
Georgia. The Supreme Court denied McCleskey relief because he had not shown that this pattern
of racial basis had been specifically or intentionally applied to him. McCleskey returned to the
Supreme Court, was denied relief in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), and was
ultimately executed.
[Vol. 30
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